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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA or “the Act”) and its 
changes to modification and termination standards in school 
desegregation, kaleidoscopic changes have altered the character of an 
important dispute resolution tool: the consent decree. Traditionally, the 
consent decree has been recognized as a hybrid between a judicial order 
and a settlement agreement entered into by parties.1 However, the 
modification and termination2 standards for both prison reform consent 
decrees and school desegregation consent decrees have changed. 
Prison reform consent decrees, along with all other types of 
institutional reform consent decrees, formerly relied on the Rufo v. 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail modification standard but now do not rely 
on this standard.3 In 1995, Congress set forth a more stringent statutory 
standard under the PLRA, making it easier to modify or terminate prison 
reform consent decrees regardless of the conditions set out in the consent 
decree. Similarly, in school desegregation consent decree cases, the 
Supreme Court started applying a “good faith” element in termination of 
school desegregation consent decrees that has allowed courts more 
discretion even when the goals of the decree have not been met. In each 
respective area, Congress and the Supreme Court changed the consent 
decree modification and termination standards to more efficiently return 
control over prisons and schools to state and local control.4 These 
 1. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992); see also Ho v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that “[o]nce the district court enters 
the settlement as a judicial consent decree ending the lawsuit, the settlement takes on the nature of a 
judgment”). A leading treatise, however, views it differently: 
The judgment is not, like the settlement agreement out of which it arose, a mere 
contract inter partes. The court is not properly a recorder of contracts; it is an organ of 
government constituted to make judicial decisions, and when it has rendered a consent 
judgment it has made an adjudication. 
1B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.409[5], at III–151 (2d ed. 1993); see 
also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681−82 (1971) (noting that consent decrees have 
characteristics of judicial orders and contracts).
 2. The First Circuit defined “terminate” as “to put an end to” or “to end.” Inmates of Suffolk 
County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 662 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 
(6th ed. 1990)). 
 3. See infra text accompanying note 74. Other consent decrees still rely on the Rufo 
modification standard. See infra Part II.C. As discussed infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text, 
parties have applied the termination standards for school desegregation consent decrees to other 
areas of institutional reform litigation. 
 4. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress’s motivations 
for creating the new PLRA termination and modification standards. See infra note 123 and 
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changes in prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees have 
altered the character of consent decrees in these two areas to resemble 
judicial orders rather than hybrids between a judicial order and 
settlement agreement and have changed incentives for parties to enter 
into consent decrees in these areas. 
Despite the changes, some courts have concluded that prison reform 
and school desegregation consent decrees continue to be governed by 
similar modification and termination standards. Although there has been 
much legal commentary recently about the changes to prison reform 
cases brought about by the PLRA5 and about the constitutionality of the 
new statutory standards of the PLRA,6 there has been no discussion 
regarding the impact of the PLRA’s statutory requirements in altering the 
nature of prison reform consent decrees. There has also been no 
discussion about the changes in school desegregation consent decree 
termination standards or the parallels between these changes and the 
changes in prison reform consent decrees. Now, eight years since the 
passage of the PLRA and over ten years since the establishment of new 
accompanying text for a discussion of the good faith standard which allows courts to more 
efficiently return school systems back to state and local control. 
 5. See, e.g., Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an Article III Court’s Inherent Equitable Powers: 
Separation of Powers and the Immediate Termination Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 972 (1999) (arguing that “Congress violates the separation of 
powers doctrine when it places restrictions on the equitable remedies afforded by Article III courts 
that adjudicate federal constitutional rights,” as it did in the Prison Litigation Reform Act); Brian M. 
Hoffstadt, Retaking the Field: The Constitutional Constraints on Federal Legislation that Displaces 
Consent Decrees, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 53, 58−62 (1999) (arguing that certain constitutional 
provisions, like “the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Due Process Clause” affect 
Congress’s “ability to retake the field” from the judiciary and “place only modest limits” on 
legislation like the PLRA); David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The “Iron Triangle” 
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2001) (“[T]he PLRA is best 
understood as a flawed product of three competing imperatives: that penal facilities be administered 
without judicial or federal interference, that costs of incarceration be controlled, and that procedural 
conduits for the protection of prisoners’ rights be instituted.”).
 6. See, e.g., Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall 
Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 394 (1998) (noting that the 
PLRA demonstrated an attempt by Congress to exert “‘overruling influence’ through the employ of 
several constitutionally questionable devices”); Deborah Decker, Comment, Consent Decrees and 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-
Management?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (analyzing the “constitutional and common sense 
infirmities of the PLRA’s [immediate termination and automatic stay] provisions” in examining 
whether they violate “constitutional principles of separation of powers”); Anne K. Heidel, Comment, 
Due Process Rights and the Termination of Consent Decrees Under the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 564 (2002) (“[T]he PLRA violates plaintiffs’ rights by denying them 
a full and fair adjudication of their constitutional and statutory claims before previously ordered 
relief is automatically stayed and ultimately terminated.”). 
BAR-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 1:21:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1336 
school desegregation termination standards, after kaleidoscopic 
application of consent decree modification standards by courts and 
unnoticed changes in the character of consent decrees, discussion of the 
broader implications of the these new standards is in order. 
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the traditional consent 
decree modification and termination standards with the new modification 
and termination standards for prison reform and school desegregation 
consent decrees to demonstrate how the new standards (1) have changed 
the character of consent decrees in these two areas to be more 
characteristic of judicial orders, (2) have altered traditional incentives to 
enter into consent decrees in these areas, and (3) will allow courts in the 
prison reform setting to achieve more success in the shared goal of more 
efficiently returning control over prisons to state and local control than 
courts will achieve in the school desegregation setting. Part II of this 
Comment discusses the traditional definition of a consent decree, the 
incentives for parties to enter into them, and a court’s authority to modify 
and terminate consent decrees and litigated judgments. Part III introduces 
school desegregation decrees and addresses the termination standard for 
desegregation decrees and the expanded use of the good faith standard to 
return control over school districts to state and local governments. Part 
IV introduces prison reform litigation, the pre-PLRA modification and 
termination standard, and the new termination provisions of the PLRA. 
Part V analyzes the new modification and termination standards of prison 
reform and school desegregation. It discusses the changes in the 
character of prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees, 
incentives to enter into them, and state and local control over consent 
decrees. It then provides a recommendation of how to balance 
disincentives to enter into school desegregation consent decrees as well 
as other consent decrees. Part VI provides a brief conclusion. 
II. CONSENT DECREES 
Before discussing the new modification and termination standards of 
prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees, this section will 
provide vital background on the definition of, incentives to enter into, 
and modification standards of traditional consent decrees. Discussion of 
traditional consent decrees will allow for later comparison with the new 
standards applied in prison reform and school desegregation consent 
decree cases. 
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A. Definition of Traditional Consent Decrees 
Traditional consent decrees are a hybrid between a judicial order and 
a settlement agreement or contract.7 A consent decree resembles a 
judicial order in that courts can enforce the agreement between parties 
and modify it in certain circumstances.8 A consent decree also resembles 
a contract because it is formed by a pretrial agreement signed by the 
parties.9 Due to the hybrid nature of a consent decree, a consent decree is 
the product of the parties’ agreement, but a court maintains long-
established, broad, and flexible equitable powers to modify the decree.10 
As evidence of the judicial character of a consent decree, a court 
maintains power to modify and terminate the decree even beyond the 
 7. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy 
in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1207 (2000) (“A consent decree is a settlement 
agreement, typically containing injunctive relief, which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.”); 
see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (“A consent decree no doubt 
embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature.”); United 
States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 n.10 (1975) (noting that consent decrees 
“have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,” a “dual character” that has resulted in 
different treatment for different purposes); see also supra note 1. 
 8. Since a consent decree is partially a judicial order, it is subject to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b), which deals with judgments and decrees. See also 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4443, at 260 (2002). 
 9. See United States v. City of Northlake, 942 F.2d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1991). In fact, 
courts have noted that district courts lack free-ranging “ancillary” or “inherent” jurisdiction to 
interpret or enforce a consent decree if “neither the decree nor the order dismissing the case 
expressly retain[s] jurisdiction” to enforce the decree. Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). But see Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 
1997) (holding that “[c]ourts . . . have a duty to enforce, interpret, modify, and terminate their 
consent decrees as required by circumstance” and that “‘[a]lthough interpretation of a consent decree 
is to follow the general rules prescribed in contract law, the courts, in effectuating the purposes or 
accomplishing the goals of a decree, are not bound under all circumstances by the terms contained 
within the four corners of the parties’ agreement’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Lorain 
NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148 (6th Cir. 1992))). The court has inherent 
power to interpret a consent decree, but this power is limited by the scope of the parties’ agreement. 
The court “will look to the plain language of the written agreement as the best expression of the 
parties’ intent.” Northlake, 942 F.2d at 1167. 
 10. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381 n.6 (citation omitted). In addition, courts have always had “inherent 
authority to enforce compliance with its orders” and broad “equitable powers” to provide a variety of 
remedies. McGee v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., No. 02 C 0277, 2002 WL 31478261, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
5, 2002) (exercising power to enter into a consent decree) (citations omitted); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); see also Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 
276 (1990) (discussing courts’ power to enforce a consent decree). Other courts have suggested that 
the court can enforce its orders and provide a remedy when a decree is violated. See Jones v. Lincoln 
Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 737 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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parties’ intent.11 As evidence of its contractual nature, a court relies on 
the intent of the parties as expressed through their agreement to interpret 
the provisions of a consent decree.12
There are two additional defining characteristics of consent decrees. 
First, the court does not resolve any factual disputes between the 
parties.13 Second, the court maintains supervision over the case for an 
indefinite period of time and retains power to enforce the decree if a 
party does not comply with its terms.14
B. Incentives to Enter into Traditional Consent Decrees 
Many incentives induce parties to enter into traditional consent 
decrees rather than to litigate or even settle cases. First, parties often 
choose to enter into consent decrees because of the flexibility of judicial 
 11. Unlike with consent decrees, when a court uses equitable remedies with contracts, its sole 
intent is to rewrite or reform the written contract to correspond to the original and actual intent of the 
parties. See, e.g., Roberson Enters., Inc. v. Miller Land & Lumber Co., 700 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ark. 
1985); Kohn v. Pearson, 670 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Ark. 1984). Professor Michal Gal notes: 
  Contract law places significant value on the freedom of market participants to 
contract. Accordingly, it strives to give effect to the parties’ intent, as long as the 
contract does not conflict with public policy. In so doing, it is concerned with the 
comparative rights and duties of the contracting parties as they are reflected in the 
contract. 
Michal S. Gal, Harmful Remedies: Optimal Reformation of Anticompetitive Contracts, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 91, 101 (2000). 
 12. 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 4443, at 257 (noting that consent degrees are “to 
be enforced in accord with the intent of the parties”). 
 13. 18A Id. § 4443, at 256–57 (noting that the court does not have to “resolve[] the substance 
of the issues presented” in consent decree cases). 
 14. See In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A consent decree is not simply a 
contract entered into between private parties seeking to effectuate parochial concerns. The court 
stands behind the decree, ready to interpret and enforce its provisions. This ongoing supervisory 
responsibility carries with it a certain correlative discretion.” (citations omitted)); see also Rufo, 502 
U.S. at 379 (noting that consent decrees are often in place for long periods of time); Lorain NAACP, 
979 F.2d at 1148 (“Because of their dual character, consent decrees may be ‘treated as contracts for 
some purposes but not for others’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 
223, 236 n.10 (1975))); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 224 (2002) (noting that consent decrees can be 
in place indefinitely); cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984) 
(“[T]he ‘scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners . . . .’” (quoting United 
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1971))); ITT Cont’l Baking, 420 U.S. at 236–37 
(“[S]ince consent decrees and orders have many of the attributes of ordinary contracts, they should 
be construed basically as contracts, without reference to the legislation the Government originally 
sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation.”).  
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oversight.15 Unlike private settlements, consent decrees have the added 
benefit of judicial “oversight and interpretation,” which allow often 
complicated consent decrees to be “carried out over a period of years.”16 
In institutional reform litigation, which involves “the operation of 
governmental institutions or organizations,” courts supervise the 
progression of the pertinent governmental institution in meeting the 
provisions of the decree until the decree is no longer necessary.17 
Judicial oversight is particularly helpful in institutional reform litigation, 
such as school desegregation and prison reform cases. 
Second, parties enter into consent decrees because parties may agree 
upon broader relief than a court may award after a trial.18 Consent 
decrees allow parties to obtain a “more flexible repertoire of enforcement 
measures.”19 In consent decrees, parties can agree to provide relief above 
the constitutional minimum, whereas if they litigated the case, the court 
would not be permitted to do so.20 Government institutions party to 
 15. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995) (“There is little question that 
the district court has wide discretion to interpret and modify a forward-looking consent 
decree . . . .”). 
 16. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 224 (2002). 
 17. Lorain NAACP, 979 F.2d at 1148; see also United States v. Louisville & Jefferson 
County Metro. Sewer Dist., 983 F.2d 1070, 1993 WL 7516, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993) (“[A] 
Consent Decree must remain in effect so long as its continued enforcement is necessary to effectuate 
its purposes.”). 
 18. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) 
(“[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the 
decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.”); Komyatti v. Bayh, 
96 F.3d 955, 963 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “a federal consent decree can contain a provision not 
explicitly required by the Constitution as long as the criteria set forth in Firefighters are met”); 
Bragg v. Robertson, 83 F. Supp. 2d 713, 721 (S.D. W.Va. 2000) (“The Court does not examine the 
[Consent] Decree to determine whether the agreement of the parties affords relief the Court could or 
would have chosen to award.”); see also United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (D. 
Colo. 1994) (noting that a judge should not “substitute [her] judgment of what constitutes an 
appropriate settlement”). However, in Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2002), the court 
distinguished Firefighters in holding that “even if a federal court is not necessarily barred from 
entering a consent decree providing broader relief than it could have awarded at trial, it must fall 
back on its own jurisdiction when it issues an order enforcing the decree.” Id. at 543. 
 19. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 524 n.13. Consent decrees allow for “imaginative and hence 
often more effective solutions to practical problems.” Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 644 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
 20. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992) (“[P]etitioners 
could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found 
by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires . . . .”). The Rufo Court noted that 
although the petitioners may have been aware that they were agreeing to single celling of prisoners 
when double celling may have been constitutional, it was “immaterial.” Id. at 388. The Court then 
noted that although “[f]ederal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, 
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consent decrees often agree to provide plaintiffs relief above the 
constitutional minimum to avoid the expense of a trial. 
Third, parties may choose a consent decree over a trial because of the 
benefits of avoiding litigation. Significant incentives exist for parties to 
settle by means of a consent decree to avoid the time, expense, and 
inevitable risk of litigation.21 In addition, litigation over a consent decree 
takes place in a single forum so that the parties avoid the waste and risk 
of litigating over choice of forum, as well as the potential problem of 
“inconsistent or conflicting obligations.”22 Moreover, in obtaining 
enforcement of a consent decree, the parties do not have to prove facts 
that they would otherwise have to prove in an ordinary action.23
to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been 
adjudicated,” petitioners could agree upon a remedy that undertook “to do more than the 
Constitution itself requires.” Id. at 389 (emphasis added). In addition, distinguishing consent decrees 
from litigated judgments, the Rufo Court concluded that parties to a consent decree can agree to a 
remedy beyond what a court would have ordered in a litigated judgment. Id. 
The Rufo Court also noted that plaintiffs in institutional reform cases “know that if they 
litigate to conclusion and win, the resulting judgment or decree will give them what is 
constitutionally adequate at that time but perhaps less than they hoped for.” Id. at 383. However, if 
plaintiffs enter into a consent decree, “[a]t least they will avoid further litigation,” the risk of losing, 
“and perhaps will negotiate a decree providing more than what would have been ordered without the 
local government’s consent.” Id.; see also id. at 391 (confirming that “[a] proposed modification 
should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor”). 
 21. Kindred, 9 F.3d at 644. Consent decrees are “economical of the court’s time and of the 
parties’ pocketbook.” Id. Also, 
[a] consent decree is a valuable tool in the effective enforcement of civil rights law. It 
permits flexibility in adapting a judicial order to the particular needs of the case at hand. 
That all interested parties have a hand in its formation leads to a greater degree of 
cooperation and reduces the inevitable friction that accompanies litigation. 
Id.; see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1217–18 (1st Cir. 1991). In addition, consent 
decrees allow for earlier resolution of disputes than litigation: 
  Early resolution by consent decree reduces the uncertainties associated with 
litigation and allows the parties to make plans based on the decree’s terms. When parties 
enter into a consent decree, they understand that controversies may arise in implementing 
the decree. The parties nevertheless anticipate that these disputes will be restricted to the 
terms negotiated by the parties and signed by the court. Thus, early resolution by consent 
decree does not necessarily end disputes between the parties, but greatly restricts their 
scope and nature. . . . Entering a consent decree rather than trying the case and hearing an 
appeal is also generally cost efficient for the judicial system. 
Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291, 
327−29 (1988). 
 22. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 524 n.13. 
 23. Id. 
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C. Courts’ Power to Modify a Consent Decree 
The source of federal courts’ modification power lies in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which provides in part that a judgment may 
be modified if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application.”24 The standard for modifying consent decrees 
was first established by United States v. Swift and Co., an antitrust case, 
and later altered by Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail for 
institutional reform cases.25
United States v. Swift and Co. “was the product of a prolonged 
antitrust battle between the Government and the meat-packing 
industry.”26 Originally, “the defendants agreed to a consent decree that 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) states in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. 
Id. However, the most significant part of the rule is the “final ground, allowing relief if it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” 11A WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 8, § 2863, at 336. 
 25. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). The Rufo Court never explicitly 
mentioned whether its modification standard applied to noninstitutional reform litigation. However, 
courts consider the Rufo standard to be the modification standard applied to all consent decree cases. 
See Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 887−88 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
Rufo requires a balancing test for all petitions brought under the equity provision of Rule 60(b)(5) 
and “cannot depend on whether the case is characterized as an institutional reform case, a 
commercial dispute, or private or public litigation”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 
1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Rufo gave the ‘coup de grace’ to Swift[;] and . . . the Supreme Court’s 
summary of what might render a modification ‘equitable’ relates to all types of injunctive relief.”); 
Alexis Lichine & Cie v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582, 586 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(positing that Rufo and Swift are “polar opposites of a continuum in which we must locate the instant 
case”); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 13 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1993) (choosing 
to “apply a flexible standard” in situations other than those involving institutional reform of an 
instrumentality of government); 12 MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, § 60.47[2][b], at 60−162 & n.17 
(3d ed. 1998) (“The better view clearly is that the flexible, Rufo standard should not be limited to 
‘institutional reform’ litigation because it ‘is no less suitable to other types of equitable cases.’” 
(citations omitted)); cf. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(refusing to apply the Rufo flexible standard to traditional commercial litigation); 12 MOORE ET AL., 
supra note 1, § 60.47[2][b], at 60−162 n.16 (listing two cases as “hav[ing] expressed doubts” about 
whether the Rufo standard applies to all equitable cases); 11A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 
2961, at 402 (2d ed. 1995) (“Courts considering modifications in other contexts have not adopted the 
Rufo . . . approach, however. Rather they have limited the holdings to those areas and have continued 
to apply the ‘grievous wrong’ standard of Swift to other contexts.”). 
 26. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 379 (1992); Swift, 286 U.S. at 
109–11. 
BAR-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 1:21:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1342 
 
enjoined them from manipulating the meat-packing industry and banned 
them from engaging in the manufacture, sale, or transportation of other 
foodstuffs.”27 Ten years later, “several meat-packers petitioned for 
modification of the decree, arguing that conditions in the meat-packing 
and grocery industries had changed.”28 The Supreme Court rejected their 
claim and refused to grant modification, holding that “[n]othing less than 
a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen 
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of 
litigation with the consent of all concerned.”29
Courts used the narrow “grievous wrong” standard to modify consent 
decrees until Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, which set forth a 
flexible standard for consent decree modification.30 In Rufo, a county 
sheriff moved for modification of a consent decree in a prison reform 
case.31 In holding that the Swift standard no longer applies, the Supreme 
Court explained in Rufo that the language in Swift did not intend a 
“hardening” of the flexible modification standard for consent decrees.32
The Supreme Court in Rufo then established a two-part test for 
modifying consent decrees in institutional reform cases.33 First, the party 
seeking to modify a consent decree “bears the burden of establishing that 
a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree”; 
that change in circumstances may be a product of “either a significant 
change either in factual conditions or in law,” or the emergence of 
“unforeseen obstacles.”34 Second, the party seeking modification of a 
consent decree must demonstrate that the “proposed modification is 
 27. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379; Swift, 286 U.S. at 111. 
 28. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379; Swift, 286 U.S. at 113. 
 29. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 30. 502 U.S. at 374–80. 
 31. Id. at 378. 
 32. Id. at 379. The court also noted that “[b]ecause such decrees often remain in place for 
extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree 
is increased.” Id. at 380; see, e.g., Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1119–21 (3d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980). 
 33. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. 
 34. Id. at 383–84. The Rufo Court also noted that its “decisions since Swift reinforce the 
conclusion that the ‘grievous wrong’ language of Swift was not intended to take on a talismanic 
quality, warding off virtually all efforts to modify consent decrees.” Id. at 380. A court may also 
modify a consent decree when a change in law brings the terms of a consent decree in conflict with 
statutory objectives. See id. at 384, 389 (emphasizing that the party must not rely on a “clarification 
in the law” since modification based on clarifications in the law would “undermine the finality” of 
consent decrees and “serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in . . . litigation”). 
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suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”35 In meeting the “suitably 
tailored” prong, the Rufo Court instructed that “[a] proposed 
modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it 
conforms to the constitutional floor.”36
D. Courts’ Power to Terminate a Consent Decree 
Courts have traditionally examined whether the terms of the decree 
have been met in deciding whether to terminate consent decrees.37 The 
Rufo standard, established originally for consent decree modification, has 
also been applied to terminate consent decrees along with the termination 
standard set forth in Board of Education v. Dowell.38 One term before 
Rufo, the Supreme Court in Dowell rejected the Swift “grievous wrong” 
 35. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. A consent decree must change no more than necessary to resolve 
the problems created by the change in circumstances and the proposed modification must not defeat 
the core purpose of the consent decree or create a constitutional violation. Id. at 391−92. 
 36. Id. at 391. Further, the Court noted that the modification inquiry requires “that the district 
court defer to local government administrators, who have the ‘primary responsibility for elucidating, 
assessing, and solving’ the problems of institutional reform, to resolve the intricacies of 
implementing a decree modification.” Id. at 392. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 
(1955) (Brown II)). However, the Court also noted that the deference to local government officials 
should only be considered in the “suitably tailored” inquiry, not in the first inquiry where the court 
determines if there has been a change in the factual circumstances or in the law that warrants 
modification of the consent decree. Id. at 392 n.14. 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 983 F.2d 
1070, 1993 WL 7516, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993) (declining to apply Freeman-Dowell to 
terminate an environmental consent decree and noting that a “consent decree should terminate when 
the purpose of the decree has been fulfilled”); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 706 F. Supp. 131, 138 
(D.R.I. 1989) (relying on Swift in noting that the goals of an employment discrimination consent 
decree must be met in order for it to be terminated). 
Some courts have applied Dowell without the “good faith” standard to non–school 
desegregation consent decree cases. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 
1991) (noting that the proper Dowell termination standard for this employment discrimination 
consent decree case was “whether the purposes of the desegregation litigation, as incorporated in the 
decree, have been fully achieved”); see also Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 13 
F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that termination and modification of a decree “should be ordered 
in light of either changed circumstances or substantial attainment of the decree’s objective”); accord 
Consumer Advisory Bd. v. Glover, 989 F.2d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 1993). 
If courts do apply Dowell to terminate consent decrees outside of the school desegregation 
setting, they should at least examine whether the specific terms of the consent decree have been met 
in terminating the decree rather than relying on the “good faith” standard. See infra notes 132–35 
and accompanying text for discussion of why the Freeman-Dowell “good faith” standard should not 
be applied outside of the school desegregation context. 
 38. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See infra notes 44–47 for cases applying 
Rufo and Dowell to terminate consent decrees. 
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standard “as a barrier to a motion”39 to terminate a school desegregation 
decree.40 The Dowell test for termination of consent decrees examined 
“[1] whether the Board had complied in good faith with the 
desegregation decree since it was entered, and [2] whether the vestiges of 
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.”41 The 
Supreme Court later applied the Dowell termination standard in Freeman 
v. Pitts,42 so this standard is referred to as the Freeman-Dowell test. 
While the Dowell holding related specifically to desegregation 
decrees, in Rufo, the Supreme Court noted that the rejection of Swift in 
Dowell illustrates the “same theme” of flexibility as the Rufo decision.43 
Due to this language in Rufo, a split exists among federal circuit courts of 
appeal regarding what standard is proper for modification versus 
termination of consent decrees. Some courts insist that the “standards 
employed in Dowell and Rufo are but variations on a single theme,” not 
separate standards for modification and termination.44 Several lower 
courts apply the Freeman-Dowell good faith and vestiges standard to 
terminate school desegregation consent decrees.45 Courts also 
interchangeably apply Freeman-Dowell with the Rufo standard to modify 
school desegregation consent decrees.46 However, other courts strictly 
 39. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. 
 40. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246–248; see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. 
 41. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50. 
 42. 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992). 
 43. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. 
 44. Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that although Rufo and 
Dowell set forth different standards, the Court’s “approach was the same” and “[i]n both cases, the 
Court eschewed Swift’s rigid ‘grievous wrong’ standard in favor of a more flexible approach 
appropriate to the situation”). 
 45. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (applying Freeman-
Dowell to partially terminate judicial supervision under consent decree), aff’d, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
 46. Alexander, 89 F.3d at 199 (noting also that “it is clear that Dowell and Rufo are entirely 
consistent; they do, indeed, sound the ‘same theme.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. City of 
Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505−06, 1508 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he principles articulated in Rufo and 
Dowell are applicable to requests to modify or terminate decrees in employment discrimination class 
actions . . . .”); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1149 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that Rufo applies in modifying school desegregation cases); Ho ex rel. Ho v. San Francisco Unified 
Sch. Dist., 965 F. Supp. 1316, 1326 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that since plaintiffs moved to 
“terminate the . . . [school desegregation] Consent Decree rather than to modify it,” it did not address 
modification under Rufo). For a more in-depth discussion of the Dowell standard in the school 
desegregation context see infra Part III.B. 
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apply Rufo to modification cases and Freeman-Dowell to termination 
cases and reject Freeman-Dowell as a replacement for Rufo.47
The next section will provide a background to school desegregation 
consent decrees and discuss the nature of judicial authority over school 
desegregation decrees and the current standard for termination of school 
desegregation decrees. 
III. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREES 
A. Background to School Desegregation Decrees 
Although segregation has been a problem for public schools 
throughout American history, the federal courts chose not to intervene to 
desegregate schools until 1954.48 In 1954, a unanimous Supreme Court 
held that racial segregation of public schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 The next year, the 
Supreme Court also directed the district courts to take “necessary and 
proper” actions to achieve nondiscriminatory school systems “with all 
deliberate speed.”50
To achieve nondiscriminatory school systems, district courts issued 
remedial desegregation decrees that required school districts to 
affirmatively act to “eliminat[e] all vestiges of state imposed 
segregation.”51 School districts demonstrate compliance with such 
 47. City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503–05, 1508–09 (ordering the district court to apply the Rufo 
standard to modification motions and the Dowell standard to termination motions); accord Heath v. 
DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630, 633–35 (6th Cir. 1993). Courts have also rejected the use of Dowell in the 
place of Rufo in noninstitutional reform litigation. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of 
Chicago, 66 F. Supp. 2d 899, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that the flexible Rufo standard, not 
Dowell, replaced the Swift standard, and that the “distinction the Dowell court makes between the 
desegregation decree and the one in Swift suggests that it would be inappropriate to use the Dowell 
standard” in modifying a civil rights decree), rev’d and remanded, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Giles v. Coughlin, No. 95 CIV. 3033 JFK, 1997 WL 770391, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1997) 
(rejecting application of the Dowell standard in favor of Rufo in a prison consent decree case). 
Currently, there is no clear distinction between the standards applied to terminate and modify 
consent decrees, but this Comment argues in Part V.E that the Dowell standard should apply to 
terminate only school desegregation consent decrees and that Rufo should apply to modify school 
desegregation and other consent decrees. 
 48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 295 (1954) (Brown II). 
 49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I). 
 50. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–301. 
 51. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
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decrees by achieving “unitary,” racially integrated school systems.52 In 
order for a court to determine whether a school district has achieved a 
unitary system, the court determines what “vestiges of past 
discrimination” or aspects of racial inequality remain and whether the 
school district acted in good faith53 and can “practicably” eliminate the 
vestiges.54 Upon demonstrating compliance, a school district may 
become free from judicial supervision by obtaining a court order 
terminating the desegregation decree. 
B. Termination of School Desegregation Decrees:  
“Vestiges” and Good Faith 
Due to the difficulty in applying the “vestiges” inquiry and because 
of the impatience of restoring local control of school systems, courts 
began applying a good faith requirement that provides opportunities for 
relinquishment of judicial supervision even when a school has not 
reached full unitary status.55 In providing guidance on the decision to 
terminate judicial supervision over a school desegregation decree, the 
Supreme Court provided the Green v. County School Board test to 
determine whether vestiges of past discrimination have been eradicated 
in a school district.56 However, even with the guidance of the Green 
 52. Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2001); Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 
456 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 53. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490, 492 (1992) (stating that good faith compliance by a 
school board is “one of the prerequisites to relinquishment of [judicial] control”). 
 54. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) (noting that the district court 
should address “whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it 
was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent 
practicable”). 
 55. Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Board of Education, 8 F.3d 1501, 1515–16 (10th Cir. 1993), 
notes that the determination of “whether the school board has proved that the racial identifiability 
present in an aspect of school operations is not causally connected to prior de jure segregation” is a 
difficult one. In addition, Hull v. Quitman County Board of Education observes: 
Following Freeman, the lower courts have discretion to terminate a desegregation case if 
a school board has consistently complied with a court decree in good faith and has 
eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent ‘practicable.’ Freeman created 
a framework in which equitable decrees will not remain in effect perpetually and school 
districts can be returned to local control. 
1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 56. 391 U.S. 430, 435–36 (1968) (noting that not all racial inequality is a “vestige” of past 
discrimination and identifying six areas to examine for racial inequality that is a vestige of past 
alleged discrimination: student assignments, administrative problems, faculty, staff, transportation, 
extracurricular activities and facilities). For a complete list of the Green factors, see Hampton v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 361 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
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factors, determining whether a vestige of past discrimination exists in a 
school district remains a complex inquiry. It is often difficult for a court 
to determine if continuing segregation in a school district is due to the 
actions of a school district or to socio-economic or housing factors 
unrelated to the school system. Due to this difficulty, many school 
districts have been managed by federal courts for long periods of time, 
conflicting with the Supreme Court’s goal of returning school districts to 
local control as soon as possible.57 While demonstration of good faith 
was mentioned early in school desegregation cases,58 Board of 
Education v. Dowell and Freeman v. Pitts were the first Supreme Court 
cases to use good faith as a factor in terminating a consent decree.59
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that the “district court 
need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration 
To obtain termination of the decree, the school district must prove that the disparity is caused 
by a nondiscriminatory policy or is due to conditions beyond its control. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494–
95. If the disparity does not fall in one of the Green areas, the party claiming the disparity is a 
vestige of past discrimination has the burden of proving the disparity is due to a constitutional 
violation caused by the school district. Id. However, this inquiry is not as straightforward as it seems. 
Often courts consider socio-economic disparities, housing situations, student choices, and national 
trends as the cause for Green factors, not pinning the racial disparity on the school district. See, e.g., 
Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 767 (3d Cir. 1996) (blaming the 
shortage of minority teachers on an “unfortunate contemporary national trend” rather than a “vestige 
of de jure segregation”); Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (noting that “federal courts should hold 
school boards accountable for their own bad conduct and its consequences, but not for all society’s 
other racial, economic, and educational ills”). 
 57. Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 941 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The ultimate objective of any 
desegregation order is the ‘restoration of state and local authorities to the control of a school system 
that is operating in compliance with the Constitution.’” (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 
89 (1995))); see Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 318 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“Implicit in the Supreme Court’s use of the term ‘practicable’ is ‘a reasonable limit on the duration 
of . . . federal supervision.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Coalition to Save Our Children, 90 F.3d 
at 760)). 
 58. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1954) (Brown II) (stating that 
“courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith 
implementation of the governing constitutional principles”) (emphasis added). 
 59. Good faith was not a factor in terminating a consent decree before Freeman and Dowell 
but was simply taken into account by the Court. In Green, the Court noted that the school board must 
establish an effective plan “toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation,” weighing 
any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their 
effectiveness. . . . [T]he availability to the board of other more promising courses of 
action may indicate a lack of good faith; and at the least it places a heavy burden upon 
the board to explain its preference for an apparently less effective method. 
391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added); cf. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 498 (noting that the Court “stated in 
Dowell that the good-faith compliance of the district with the court order over a reasonable period of 
time is a factor to be considered in deciding whether or not jurisdiction could be relinquished”) 
(emphasis added). 
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until a school district has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its 
system.”60 Rather, “[p]artial relinquishment of judicial control, where 
justified by the facts of the case, can be an important and significant step 
in fulfilling the district court’s duty to return the operations and control 
of schools to local authorities.”61 The Court then considered good faith 
in ordering a withdrawal of control over a school district in examining 
whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the 
parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith 
commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions 
of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial 
intervention in the first instance.62
Freeman established the “good-faith commitment” to the court’s 
decree as a required factor for relinquishment of judicial control. It 
applied the good faith inquiry to partially relinquish judicial control, but 
left room for courts to apply it to relinquish full judicial control over 
schools.63 The Freeman “good faith” requirement has been applied to 
free school districts of judicial supervision of desegregation decrees 
when the “vestiges” test alone would not have allowed relinquishment of 
judicial control.64
 60. 503 U.S. at 471. 
 61. Id. at 489. 
 62. Id. at 491 (emphasis added). In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court reaffirmed the Freeman 
test emphasizing the importance of a school district’s good faith compliance with the desegregation 
decree. 515 U.S. 70, 89, 98–100 (1995). 
 63. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491. See also Liddell ex rel. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 126 F.3d 
1049, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court will consider the Dowell and Freeman 
factors in deciding “whether to grant full or partial unitary status” in a school desegregation case) 
(emphasis added). 
 64. For example, after instruction by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals in Dowell 
reviewed the findings to determine if any “vestiges” of state-enforced segregation still existed. In 
determining whether any “vestiges” existed, the court made a point to mention that the “racial 
identifiability present in an aspect of school operations is not [always] causally connected to prior de 
jure segregation.” Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501, 1515–16 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The court then reviewed the residential segregation in Oklahoma City and found “independent bases 
for concluding that the vestiges of de jure school segregation had been eliminated to the extent 
practicable.” Id. at 1516. The court attributed the segregation existing in the Oklahoma schools to 
“individuals making private choices in response to economic and social forces over which the school 
board had no control.” Id. Only after finding that there were independent factors that could have 
caused the segregation in Oklahoma City, the court found that the Oklahoma City school board 
demonstrated good faith. Id. at 1513. 
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IV. PRISON REFORM CONSENT DECREES 
This section provides background to prison reform litigation before 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act and discusses the relevant termination 
provisions of the PLRA. 
A. Background to Pre-PLRA Prison Reform Litigation 
Early on, federal courts did not intervene in prison reform, but 1960s 
and 1970s prison reform cases were litigated and later cases settled 
through consent decree.65 The early stance of the federal courts was not 
to intervene on behalf of state prisoners under the “hands-off attitude.”66 
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court altered its course 
in allowing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be used to assert prisoners’ 
constitutional rights.67 By 1995, twenty-five percent of suits filed in 
federal district court were brought by prisoners.68 While the first set of 
prison reform cases were litigated, later generations of prison reform 
cases were settled by consent decree.69 With the growth of prison 
 65. Litigation over prison conditions in federal court is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.02, at 7 (2d ed. 1993) (“The Constitution did not 
breach prison walls for over 170 years.”). 
 66. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (stating that “[t]raditionally, federal 
courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration,” due 
mostly to the “complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of 
judicial intervention”), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (overruling 
Martinez and holding that prison regulations must comply with a reasonableness standard). 
 67. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). Before long, prison reform litigation 
resulted in class action lawsuits by prisoners leading to  
the definition and enforcement of minimum standards of health care, to the establishment 
of minimum procedural due-process requirements for the imposition of disciplinary 
punishments, to the equal protection of the laws for different categories of inmates, and to 
the upholding of the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual 
punishments. 
Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965–Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 
245 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
 68. Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1995 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 167); see also 
Ashley Dunn, A Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort to Limit Filings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
1994, at A1 (commenting on the proliferation of prisoner lawsuits in the judicial system). The 
number of lawsuits filed by prisoners grew from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 1994. 141 
CONG. REC. S14,413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); see also Heidel, supra note 
6, at 561. 
 69. In these consent decree cases, “prison administrators frequently agreed to wide-ranging 
changes in prison practices that exceeded the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. California, 220 
F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that under prison consent decrees the role of federal courts 
“has been especially ‘hands-on’—e.g., appointing special masters, imposing sanctions for contempt, 
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litigation, Congress witnessed an analogous growth in “out-dated consent 
decrees” managed by federal courts.70
B. Termination Provisions of the PLRA 
To put an end to federal courts’ long-term involvement in prison 
reform through consent decrees under the Rufo standard, Congress 
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act.71 The Act was passed to stop 
federal courts from “micromanaging our Nation’s prisons.”72 Congress 
clearly intended to reduce judicial involvement in the improvement of 
prison conditions and to stop federal courts from providing more than the 
constitutional minimum “necessary to remedy the proven violation of 
federal rights.”73 
The PLRA replaces the Rufo modification standard and the Dowell 
termination standard74 with a standard that makes it more difficult to 
maintain judicial supervision over prison reform consent decrees. Under 
the PLRA, the relief provided in a consent decree must be terminated 
immediately if granted without satisfying the decree’s requirements.75 
Courts refer to the three requirements for terminating or modifying 
consent decrees as the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings.”76 In the 
and modifying or expanding the relief provided by the decrees—where prison administrators have 
failed to effectuate the terms of the decrees”). 
 70. Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance Between 
Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REV. 981, 1003 (1999). 
 71. See infra notes 72–73. 
 72. 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also id. 
at S14,414 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“These guidelines will work to 
restrain liberal Federal judges who see violations on [sic] constitutional rights in every prisoner 
complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local prison systems.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 24 n.2 (1995); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-378, at 166 (1995) 
(“[The PLRA] amends 18 U.S.C. 3626 to require that prison condition remedies do not go beyond 
the measures necessary to remedy federal rights violations . . . .”). 
 74. PLRA § 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (e)(1) require all prison consent decrees being 
modified or terminated in a litigated or consent decree case to be ruled on promptly by a court 
according to the termination provisions of § 3626(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2). These subsections also 
demonstrate that the PLRA termination standards replace former Rufo and Dowell standards applied 
in modifying and terminating consent decrees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (e)(1) (2000). 
 75. Id. § 3626(b)(2) (providing “immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief 
was approved or granted in the absence of a finding” of need-narrowness-intrusiveness); see also 
Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 55 (1997) (explaining the PLRA 
termination provisions). 
 76. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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termination provisions,77 the PLRA first sets out that all prospective 
relief “with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular 
plaintiff or plaintiffs.”78 It also requires that the prospective relief be 
“narrowly drawn” and be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct 
the violation of the Federal right.”79 The PLRA also provides that a 
federal court shall immediately terminate prospective relief if the relief 
was “approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court” of 
need-narrowness-intrusiveness.80 However, if a written finding of need-
narrowness-intrusiveness is made demonstrating that the relief is 
necessary to “correct a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right,” 
the court will not terminate the decree.81
 77. Although these requirements are used to terminate and modify consent decrees they are 
often referred to as the “termination provisions.” See, e.g., Heidel, supra note 6, at 562. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. § 3626(b)(2). As discussed infra Part V.A.1, the PLRA defines consent decrees as 
“prospective relief.” 
 81. Id. § 3626(b)(3). The text of the Act is unclear about how a court is to find a “current and 
ongoing” violation. The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on this issue, but one court 
explained that the (b)(3) requirement of “written findings” means that the immediate termination of 
(b)(2) was necessarily less than instantaneous. Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 
1999) (noting that “immediate” in (b)(2) does not mean “instant,” given that the court needs “time to 
decide whether to make [the] finding” called for in (b)(3)). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
clarified § 3626(b)(3) by holding that “a court must look at the conditions in the jail at the time 
termination is sought” but no evidentiary hearing is necessarily required. Castillo v. Cameron 
County, 238 F.3d 339, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (examining evidence on conditions of Texas prisons 
produced in the year that the termination was sought to rule if current and ongoing constitutional 
violations existed, but not explicitly requiring a district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing); 
accord Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975, 983 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
Other courts have suggested that only some circumstances warrant additional evidentiary 
findings and some courts actually require them for all circumstances. See, e.g., Laaman v. Warden, 
238 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2001) (“In certain circumstances . . . it would seem an appropriate use of 
the court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing; similarly, in certain circumstances it would be 
an abuse of that discretion to deny plaintiffs an evidentiary hearing once requested.”). The Laaman 
court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs an opportunity to 
supplement evidence of violations after 1995 when terminating the consent decree in 1999. Id. at 19; 
see also Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 671−72 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the party opposing 
termination must be given the opportunity to submit additional evidence”); Gilmore v. California, 
220 F.3d 987, 1008 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[U]nless plaintiffs do not contest defendants’ showing that 
there is no current and ongoing violation under § 3626(b)(3), the court must inquire into current 
conditions at a prison before ruling on a motion to terminate.”); Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253, 258 
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court, “[a]t a minimum, . . . must hold . . . a [pretermination 
evidentiary] hearing when the party opposing termination alleges specific facts which, if true, would 
amount to a current and ongoing constitutional violation”); Loyd v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 176 F.3d 
1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing to find that an evidentiary hearing was mandated by the PLRA, 
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In essence, the default rule of the PLRA is that federal courts 
terminate or modify a consent decree immediately.82 The exception to 
the rule is that a consent decree will continue to be enforced by the 
federal court, but only if the relief set out in the decree continues to meet 
the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements and is “necessary to 
correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.”83
Part III discussed the new termination standards for school 
desegregation consent decrees established by the “good faith” prong of 
Freeman-Dowell. Part IV analyzed the termination and modification 
standard for prison reform consent decrees set forth by the statutory 
provisions of the PLRA. The next section will discuss the implications of 
these new modification and termination standards in changing the 
character of prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees and 
returning state and local control over decrees. 
but holding that a district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion, 
even when current reports were provided to the court); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“Evidence presented at a prior time . . . [can]not show a violation that is ‘current and 
ongoing.’ Hence, the ‘record’ referred to [in § 3626(b)(3)] . . . must mean a record reflecting 
conditions as of the time termination is sought.”) (emphasis added); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 
597 (8th Cir. 1998) (agreeing that parties in favor of prospective relief under the PLRA must be 
given an opportunity on remand to present evidence supporting such relief). 
While the PLRA does not specify whether courts are required to conduct evidentiary hearings 
at the time of the termination motion to determine whether to terminate a consent decree or litigated 
judgment, since the main purpose of the PLRA was to stop federal courts from maintaining long-
term control over state prison systems, it seems that this purpose would not be hindered if a court 
holds an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a termination motion. Conducting an evidentiary 
hearing simply complies with the termination provisions of the PLRA in ensuring that no current 
and ongoing constitutional violation exists before terminating a decree. 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1). That section also provides circumstances in which the court may 
wait one or two years to terminate relief: 
 (1) Termination of prospective relief.—(A) In any civil action with respect to prison 
conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the 
motion of any party or intervener— 
  (i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief; 
  (ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of 
prospective relief under this paragraph; or 
  (iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment. 
Id. 
 83. Id. § 3626(b)(3). 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION 
STANDARDS FOR PRISON REFORM AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
CONSENT DECREES 
Despite statements by some courts,84 modification and termination 
standards for prison reform and school desegregation cases have 
undergone dramatic changes since the PLRA and the implementation of 
the Freeman-Dowell standard. These new standards have changed the 
character of, incentives to enter into, and state control over prison reform 
and school desegregation consent decrees. First, the PLRA and Freeman-
Dowell standards have respectively changed the character of prison 
reform and school desegregation consent decrees from a hybrid judicial 
order and settlement agreement, so that they now more closely resemble 
judicial orders. Second, due to new standards, the PLRA better addresses 
the general concern of the Supreme Court of returning prisons to state 
and local control than Freeman-Dowell does with school systems. Third, 
the new standards change incentives for parties to choose to enter into 
prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees rather than 
litigate. Finally, a recommendation is provided which, if followed by 
courts, will balance the disincentive for parties to enter school 
desegregation consent decrees and possibly decrease the disincentive to 
enter other types of consent decrees. 
A. Change in Traditional Character of Prison Reform Consent Decrees 
Since the PLRA, prison reform consent decrees have changed in 
three major ways. First, the definition and traditional character of prison 
 84. Some courts have insisted that the PLRA is in line with the standards established by 
Supreme Court precedent for granting remedies in cases of constitutional violations. See Imprisoned 
Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the “PLRA amounts to little 
more than a codification of already-existing rules governing judicial interference with prisons” in 
“limit[ing] . . . the court’s authority to issue prospective injunctive relief to remedy constitutional 
violations”); Green v. Peters, No. 71 C 1403, 1997 WL 769458, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1997) 
(noting that the “PLRA does not in fact deprive courts of their authority to decide and remedy 
constitutional violations in prison condition cases . . . completely in line with what case precedent 
otherwise requires”) (emphasis added). The Green court cites Smith v. Arkansas Department of 
Corrections, which holds that in prison conditions cases Supreme Court precedent requires that “the 
remedy must not go beyond what is necessary to remedy the particular constitutional injury.” 103 
F.3d 637, 645–46 (8th Cir. 1996). However, note also that Smith is a prison reform case involving a 
litigated decree, not a consent decree. The Green court fails to acknowledge that although federal 
judges were restrained in providing broad constitutional remedies in pre-PLRA litigated cases, in 
consent decree cases under Rufo, judges were allowed to provide remedies above the constitutional 
minimum. 
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reform consent decrees has changed from a judicially enforced 
settlement agreement between parties to “relief” provided by a judicial 
order.85 Second, prison reform consent decrees no longer require 
changed circumstances to modify or terminate a decree. Third, prison 
reform consent decrees now depart from traditional consent decrees in 
that they no longer provide relief above the constitutional minimum. 
These three changes have resulted in a change in the character of prison 
consent decrees, resulting in prison consent decrees resembling judicial 
orders rather than hybrid settlement agreements and judicial orders. 
1. Prison reform consent decrees change from a judicially enforced 
settlement agreement to “relief” 
Post-PLRA prison reform consent decrees define consent decrees as 
“relief.” One year before the PLRA, the courts referred to consent 
decrees as settlement agreements “subject to continued judicial 
policing . . . [that] should be construed to preserve the position for which 
the parties bargained.”86 However, § 3262(g)(1) of the PLRA defined 
consent decrees as “any relief entered by the court that is based in whole 
or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties.”87
One demonstration that the PLRA change in definition of a consent 
decree to “relief” is more than semantic88 is the confusion over the 
meaning of “termination of prospective relief” in § 3626(b)(2). All 
circuit courts of appeal have now interpreted the PLRA termination 
provisions to mean that if a consent decree does not meet the need-
narrowness-intrusiveness requirements, both the consent decree and the 
relief set out in it must be terminated.89 However, under the Second 
 85. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 86. United States v. Michigan, 62 F.3d 1418, 1995 WL 469430, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1995) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(1) (emphasis added). The definition of consent decrees excludes 
private settlements. Id. 
 88. Although it can be argued that the PLRA’s definition of consent decrees as “relief” rather 
than a judicially enforced settlement agreement is simply a semantic difference, misinterpretation of 
the termination standard by the Second Circuit as well as congressional motivations to change the 
definition of the consent decree are good indications that this was a definitional change that had real 
implications. 
 89. Currently, all of the circuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have upheld the 
PLRA termination provisions against a separation of powers challenge. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 
172 F.3d 144, 161–62 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc); Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 
1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 656−57 (1st Cir. 1997); Dougan v. 
Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426–27 (11th Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1996). However, the Ninth Circuit 
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Circuit’s former interpretation, the PLRA did not terminate the 
underlying consent decree but denied the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
enforce prospective relief within the decree, allowing state courts to 
enforce the relief provided by a decree.90 Consent decrees have 
traditionally been defined as judicially enforced settlement “agreements” 
formed by parties as an alternative to litigation or traditional settlement; 
whereas the “relief” provided in a case has always been a function of 
courts, not parties, to determine after trial. Since terminating consent 
decrees without the consent of parties has not been a function of courts,91 
the Second Circuit was justifiably confused in not allowing consent 
decrees to be terminated by courts under the PLRA.92
Another demonstration that the definitional change is more than 
semantic is a strong congressional motivation to limit the judicial role 
and to avoid constitutional problems in changing the purpose of a prison 
consent decree.93 Again, since providing relief has traditionally been a 
struck down the PLRA on separation of powers grounds but then vacated the opinion. Taylor v. 
United States, 143 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated by 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 90. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 177 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated on reh’g en banc, 172 
F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999). The former Second Circuit interpretation was also considered by the court 
in Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1997). It is 
important to note that the PLRA provisions make no distinction and apply the same standard to 
modifying and terminating decrees. See supra note 77. 
 91. Courts have been allowed to terminate consent decrees sua sponte when significant 
changes in circumstances have occurred or the purposes of the decree have been satisfied. Courts 
have also terminated decrees sua sponte or upon motion by parties when parties demonstrate that the 
consent decree has achieved its objective or when the court determines that the goals of the decree 
have been met. For example, in United States v. City of Miami, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
  When the remedy prescribed in the consent decree has been accomplished, a district 
court does not have to await a party’s motion to terminate a decree which requires 
temporary supervisory jurisdiction of an agreed upon consent decree. . . . [T]he district 
court . . . is authorized to consider sua sponte whether termination of the consent decree 
is appropriate. 
2 F.3d 1497, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993). Before the PLRA however, courts could not terminate consent 
decrees without a change in circumstances. This is discussed infra Part V.A.2. 
 92. It should also be noted that the Second Circuit made a major flaw in interpreting § 3626. 
The major flaw in the Second Circuit’s former interpretation of the provision is reading the word 
“termination” out of the PLRA and substituting it with the word “jurisdiction.” Termination of a 
consent decree has always meant that the court “put an end to” a consent decree, so if the decrees 
were really “terminated,” as the PLRA states, then neither federal nor state courts could enforce the 
relief existing in consent decrees. Rouse, 129 F.3d at 662. 
 93. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(1) (2000); Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of 
Incarceration: Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 400, S. 866, S. 930, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting the importance of restoring 
control of the prisons to the states and to the political branches). 
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judicial function, the court and Congress have been able to restrict it;94 
however, setting the terms for a consent decree has been a party function, 
so the court is less justified in limiting consent decree terms. In changing 
the definition of a consent decree to relief, Congress may have intended 
to enforce its power to limit the relief in consent decrees without 
explicitly forcing courts to alter the decree’s terms. This allows the 
removal of federal courts from excessive involvement brought about by 
parties’ agreements and restores the power of the federal courts to 
determine the appropriate relief for the violation at hand without 
infringing on the rights of parties. In addition to restoring the power of 
determining appropriate relief in the prison reform cases to federal 
courts, Congress may have been trying to avoid constitutional problems 
that could exist in terminating a settlement, or even worse, a contract 
between the parties, by instead referring to consent decrees as 
“prospective relief.”95
Rather than allowing parties freedom to establish relief that exceeds the constitutional 
minimum and goes beyond what the court might order in a litigated judgment, Congress may have 
intended to limit the judicial role. Changing the definition of a consent decree from a “judicially 
enforced agreement” to “relief” seems to justify Congress’s removal of parties’ flexibility to enter 
consent decrees through the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements. 
 94. Congress clearly has the power to alter the standard for prospective relief provided by 
courts. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856) 
(Wheeling II) (standing for the proposition that when Congress alters the substantive law on which 
an injunction is based, the injunction may be enforced only insofar as it conforms to the changed 
law); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 232 (1995) (noting that in Wheeling II 
Congress altered the prospective effect of an injunction entered by an Article III court); Sys. Fed’n 
No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650−53 (1961) (holding that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to revise an injunction to permit labor practice that had been 
unlawful when the consent decree was entered but later legalized by Congress). 
 95. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 450 (2001) (quoting Miller v. French 530 U.S. 327, 344–45 (2000)); id. at 449 
n.79 (2001) (“While Miller addressed the constitutionality of the PLRA’s automatic stay 
provision . . . its separation of powers rationale is essentially the same as that of the courts of appeals 
in upholding [its] judgment termination provisions . . . .” (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court 
has not ruled whether the PLRA termination provisions, which allow Congress to place requirements 
on a court in termination, violate the separation of powers; however, all circuit courts of appeal that 
have addressed this issue have declared these provisions to be constitutional. While the Supreme 
Court has not explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of the PLRA termination provisions, the Court 
ruled in Miller, 530 U.S. at 344–45, that the PLRA’s automatic stay provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e), 
is constitutional because it does not prescribe a rule of decision but imposes the consequences of the 
court’s application of a new legal standard. 
For the text of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements see supra text accompanying 
notes 76–80. 
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2. Prison reform consent decrees no longer require “changed 
circumstances” 
The PLRA eliminated the “changed circumstances” requirement to 
modify consent decrees, demonstrating that post-PLRA prison reform 
consent decrees have changed from a hybrid judicial order and contract 
to a judicial order. 
Currently, the PLRA no longer requires a component of “changed 
circumstances” to terminate or modify a consent decree. Under Rufo, one 
of the two requirements for modifying a consent decree was a significant 
and unforeseen change in circumstances from the time the consent 
decree was issued. This requirement brought out the contractual 
character of a consent decree because, like a contract, the decree could 
not be changed unless dramatic changes occurred. Instead, the PLRA 
adopted need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements that resemble 
Rufo’s second prong, which provides that a modification be “suitably 
tailored” to the circumstances. The PLRA requires any relief to extend 
“no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right” 
and requires prospective relief to be “narrowly drawn.”96 This PLRA 
provision does not require any change of circumstance to modify or 
terminate a decree, as previously required by the first Rufo prong.97 For 
example, if a pre-PLRA consent decree prohibits actions beyond what is 
necessary to correct a constitutional violation, it can now be terminated 
under the PLRA if there are no current violations of constitutional rights 
in that prison, even if no circumstances have changed from the time of 
entry into the consent decree. The PLRA only inquires whether the 
“consent decree is currently necessary,” “not whether the defendants are 
in compliance with the consent decree” or whether “the objectives of the 
consent decree have been achieved.”98
Now the focus of the court is on narrowly remedying the 
constitutional violation rather than granting the parties exactly what they 
bargained for in an agreement. This requirement also seems to emphasize 
the new “relief” definition of a prison reform consent decree rather than 
the former “settlement agreement” definition. Elimination of the changed 
circumstances requirement by the PLRA demonstrates the change in 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 97. For discussion of the Rufo test see supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 98. Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662, 673 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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character of the consent decree from a hybrid judicial order and contract 
to a purely judicial order. 
3. Prison reform consent decrees no longer allow relief above the 
constitutional minimum 
Parties to prison reform consent decrees can no longer provide 
remedies above the constitutional minimum, demonstrating that post-
PLRA prison reform consent decrees have changed from a hybrid 
judicial order and contract to a purely judicial order. 
Unlike the previous Rufo standard, which allowed consent decrees to 
provide relief above the constitutional minimum,99 the PLRA now 
prohibits all prospective relief dealing with prison conditions from 
exceeding the constitutional minimum.100 Previously, one motivation to 
enter into consent decrees in institutional reform cases was that consent 
decrees could provide relief above that required by the constitutional 
minimum.101 With the PLRA, defendants lose their bargaining power to 
provide more relief than the constitutional minimum in exchange for 
saving the plaintiffs, who are unsure of the current posture of the law, the 
risk of a trial.102 Removal of parties’ bargaining power in providing 
relief diminishes the contractual nature of a consent decree. The PLRA’s 
removal of parties’ discretion in providing relief above a constitutional 
minimum further demonstrates the change in the character of a consent 
decree from a hybrid court order and settlement agreement to a purely 
judicial order. 
 99. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for discussion of the Rufo standard allowing 
remedies above the constitutional minimum. 
 100. Under the PLRA, prospective relief may not be granted “unless the court finds that such 
relief is narrowly drawn . . . and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 
743–44 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The limits on federal court jurisdiction are [that relief should only be 
provided if it is] no more than necessary to correct the underlying constitutional violation.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000))); Watson v. 
Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a consent decree was subject to immediate 
termination under the PLRA partly because it provided “more relief than the Constitution required”). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
 102. Often prison reform plaintiffs also used the option of providing relief above the 
constitutional minimum as a way to induce defendants to avoid the cost of a trial. See supra note 20 
for further discussion. 
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B. Change in Traditional Character of School  
Desegregation Consent Decrees 
The character of school desegregation consent decrees has also 
changed from a hybrid to now resemble a judicial order more than a 
settlement agreement. The Supreme Court, instead of Congress, has 
altered the definition of consent decrees in the school desegregation 
arena through Freeman-Dowell. Under the Freeman-Dowell test, both 
the vestiges and good faith standards allow for broad judicial discretion 
in termination of a consent decree. As discussed above, to relinquish 
federal court supervision under the Freeman-Dowell test, a school 
system must ultimately prove both that it has “complied in good faith 
with the desegregation decree since it was entered” and that “the vestiges 
of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent 
practicable.”103
The “vestiges” inquiry grants more weight to eliminating the 
constitutional violation set out in the decree and focuses more on giving 
the parties what they bargained for, but still allows for judicial discretion. 
Courts claim that the obligation to eliminate vestiges of discrimination is 
a constitutional as well as a “contractual” obligation.104 However, when 
the contractual obligation is evaluated, the enforcement does not 
resemble the enforcement of a traditional contract because judges often 
retain flexibility to interpret the findings. The vestiges prong of the 
Freeman-Dowell test allows for flexibility in that the parties only have to 
eliminate vestiges of past discrimination provided in the decree “to the 
extent practicable,” not to the “maximum” extent possible.105
 103. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–
50 (1991). 
 104. See NAACP v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2001).  
“[T]he obligations required of each party to a consent decree must be found ‘within its 
four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties 
to it.’” 
  The Board, of course, must also meet its constitutional obligation to eliminate the 
vestiges of de jure segregation to the extent practicable. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 978 
F.2d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–51. 
 105. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (noting that the test is whether the school district eliminated 
vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable, not to its “maximum potential”); Duval 
County Sch., 273 F.3d at 973–74 (“The Supreme Court has made quite clear, however, that the 
Constitution does not require a school board to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination ‘to the 
maximum extent practicable.’” (citations omitted)). 
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Even more so, the good faith inquiry allows judges to examine 
defendants’ attitudes and dealings with plaintiffs and toward court 
orders, and generally allows courts broad judicial discretion and 
flexibility.106 The good faith analysis depends largely on whether the 
defendants acted in compliance with court orders and the decree and 
sought to achieve its goals rather than on whether a violation set out in 
the decree still exists.107 In determining that a school district fulfilled the 
good faith prong of the Freeman test, one court noted that the plaintiff 
“views the good-faith glass as half-empty,” recognizing that there was 
conflicting evidence that could lead to a finding that the school district 
acted in good or bad faith but going on to hold that the school district 
acted in good faith.108
In allowing broader judicial discretion with the vestiges and good 
faith inquiries, the Freeman-Dowell test changed the character of a 
consent decree from a hybrid court order and settlement agreement to a 
decree most resembling a judicial order. With the good faith requirement, 
the Court intended to terminate more consent decrees and to free more 
school districts from federal court control. However, the Court attempted 
 106. Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that “discerning a 
school board’s good faith is in some respects a subjective finding . . . [and] depends in part on the 
judge’s personal observation of the witnesses”). 
 107. Determining whether a constitutional violation still exists can be a difficult task. See 
Dowell ex rel. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501, 1515−16 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that “the court 
must undertake the difficult task of determining whether the school board has proved that the racial 
identifiability present in an aspect of school operations is not causally connected to prior de jure 
segregation”) (emphasis added); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249−50 (pointing out that the school board 
complied with court orders and lacked intent to discriminate in examining the good faith of the 
school board). The good faith inquiry may simplify the termination decision because rather than 
relying on conflicting expert opinion on the root of segregation in a certain city, the court can just 
examine the court record for evidence of a reasonable period of good faith compliance with a 
consent decree. The good faith inquiry is relied upon in school desegregation cases because the 
cause of racial segregation in schools can be linked either to a school district’s actions or to social 
and economic factors, making it difficult for a judge to decipher a constitutional violation from 
voluntary housing segregation. Good faith often can be the factor that tips the scale, allowing courts 
to terminate judicial supervision over decrees. 
 108. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d at 974–75. The Duval court asserts that “the Board has 
never been found to be in violation of any provision” of the consent decree and that it has “exhibited 
enormous good faith in performing its agreement to craft a school system which protects student and 
parent choice while vigorously encouraging a race neutral distribution of students throughout the 
system,” even though it opted not to use all of the “standard school desegregation techniques” 
mentioned in the consent decree. Id. However, the dissent argues that these “techniques” “failed to 
achieve” the goals of the CSA, the document that outlined the goals of the school board, “with 
regard to the core city’s historically black schools under the magnet program, and that it did not give 
fair consideration to the CSA’s supplementary methods for desegregating these schools.” Id. at 988 
(Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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to return school districts to local control, not by reducing judicial 
discretion, as with the PLRA, but by allowing broader judicial discretion 
and thereby degrading the contractual character of a consent decree.109
C. State and Local Control over Prisons and School Systems 
The change in character of school desegregation and prison reform 
consent decrees impacts the ability of courts to return school systems and 
prisons back to state and local control. Two hallmark traits shared by 
former school desegregation and prison consent decrees were broad 
judicial discretion to modify the decree and long-term judicial 
enforcement of the decree. These traits hindered courts from quickly 
returning prisons and school systems to state and local control.110
First, “broader judicial discretion to modify the [consent decree was] 
‘required so that the agreed upon solution to the problem giving rise to 
the litigation [would be] fine-tuned to accomplish its goal.’”111 However, 
there is a conflict with the courts having “broad” remedial power and 
 109. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts use both the 
Rufo and Dowell standards to rule on termination and modification motions. 
 110. Three hallmark traits are set out in Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Board of Education to 
describe and justify a flexible modification standard for institutional reform consent decrees. Two of 
the traits are described in the text accompanying notes 111 and 116. The third trait is that 
institutional consent decrees “affect more than the rights of the immediate litigants.” Lorain NAACP 
v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1149 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 
1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989)). School desegregation decrees often affect the rights of those beyond the 
immediate litigants and courts have not made limitations in this area. Heath, 888 F.2d at 1109 
(“While institutional consent decrees are similarly born by agreement between the parties, they 
affect more than the rights of the immediate litigants. The decrees reach beyond the parties involved 
directly in the suit and impact on the public’s right to the sound and efficient operation of its 
institutions.”). But see Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining 
Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 580 (1997) (noting that Congress wants to “restrict the broad based 
remedies” in prison reform litigation and possibly in school desegregation and employment 
discrimination litigation). However, under PLRA § 3626(a)(1)(A), prospective relief granted to 
prisoners only extends to “correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or 
plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). This new requirement seems to do 
away with the prior goal of institutional litigation, which was to “affect more than the rights of 
immediate litigants.” It is unclear whether the § 3626(a)(1)(A) language provides any substantive 
limitations, but defendants have unsuccessfully argued that this language prohibits certification of 
prisoner class actions. Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The district 
court rejected defendant’s argument holding that this provision “addresses only the type of relief 
courts may use to redress constitutional violations, and says nothing about the nature of the 
proceedings underlying the remedy ordered by the court.” Id. (citing Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 
1373, 1380 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that, in lawsuits which challenge confinement conditions arising 
under any federal law, § 3626(a)(1) limits the available remedies). 
 111. Lorain NAACP, 979 F.2d at 1149 (quoting Heath, 888 F.2d at 1109); United States v. 
Michigan, 62 F.3d 1418, 1995 WL 469430, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1995). 
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ability to control consent decrees for “extended periods of time” and 
allowing states to maintain local control over their prisons and 
prisoners.112 As demonstrated above, under Freeman-Dowell, the Court 
views broad judicial discretion to modify a school desegregation consent 
decree as necessary to achieve a “fine-tuned” result.113 In the prison area, 
the PLRA greatly narrows judicial discretion in prison reform cases to 
achieve prospective relief that is “narrowly drawn” and “extends no 
further than necessary.”114 The PLRA parts with former decree standards 
under which federal courts maintained control over day-to-day concerns 
of the state prisons, such as the nutrition, health, exercise, and mail 
distribution to prisoners over decades.115 In other words, the PLRA and 
Freeman-Dowell use different means (broad judicial discretion versus 
narrow judicial discretion) to achieve the same goal (fine-tuned, 
narrowly drawn solutions to institutional reform litigation). 
Second, courts formerly maintained the long-term ability to modify 
consent decrees, since consent decrees were assumed to last for 
“extended periods of time, [which increased] the likelihood of significant 
changes occurring during the life of the decree.”116 In the school 
desegregation area, courts often still supervise school desegregation 
decrees for decades at a time and terminate a decree when it is no longer 
necessary, rather than when it negatively impacts state institutions. Even 
the new good faith requirement, intended more promptly to return school 
districts to local control, requires judicial time and resources to establish 
a history of compliance for a party.117 Establishing good faith is no easy 
 112. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992); see also Michigan, 
1995 WL 469430, at *8 (keeping in mind the “strong considerations of comity that require giving a 
state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors thus 
also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal 
administration of their prisons” (quoting Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1984))). 
 113. See Lorain NAACP, 979 F.2d at 1149. 
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
 115. Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 464−65 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that the plaintiffs 
“alleged that defendants ‘unreasonably delayed the delivery of incoming mail and the posting of 
outgoing mail, and have . . . failed or refused to deliver incoming mail or post outgoing mail’”) 
(alteration in original); Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 281−82 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the First 
Amendment requires that prison officials provide inmates with “a kosher diet sufficient to sustain the 
[i]nmates in good health”). 
 116. See Lorain NAACP, 979 F.2d at 1149 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380) (alteration in 
original); see also Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1119–21 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(allowing modification of a consent decree because of changed circumstances not contemplated by 
the court or parties when entering the decree and beyond defendants’ control). 
 117. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249−50 (1991) (emphasis added). In Dowell, the 
Court noted that the district court should address “whether the Board had complied in good faith 
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task and will not likely reduce the burden and time commitment of 
federal courts in school desegregation decrees.118 Managing the 
modification and enforcement of consent decrees will continue to 
consume judicial time and resources as well as limit the power and 
accountability of states in controlling their school systems. 
In contrast, under the PLRA, either party to a consent decree can 
move to terminate the decree only two years after the consent decree is 
created.119 The likelihood of changes occurring during the life of a 
PLRA decree are less than with other institutional reform decrees 
because the PLRA demands that federal courts choose the “least 
intrusive” means of correcting a violation considering the impact to the 
state criminal justice system.120
The PLRA standards, rejecting broad judicial discretion and long-
term judicial control in the prison reform area, have allowed courts to 
more quickly return control over prisons to state and local governments 
than school desegregation decrees under Freeman-Dowell. The hallmark 
traits shared by prison reform and school desegregation consent decrees 
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination 
[have] been eliminated to the extent practicable.” Id. It also noted that “[n]ot only do the personnel 
of school boards change over time, but the same passage of time enables the District Court to 
observe the good faith of the school board in complying with the decree.” Id. at 249 (emphasis 
added); see also Charles L. Patin, Jr. & William M. Gordon, School Desegregation Cases: The 
“Good Faith” Requirement, 159 ED. L. REP. 407, 407 (2002) (“The ‘good faith’ requirement may be 
the single most difficult of all the requirements of a unitary [school] system.”). In addition to the 
difficulty, Patin & Gordon also emphasize the length of time it takes for a school district to establish 
good faith. They note that the “good faith” requirement consists of a “history of compliance with the 
orders of the court, punctuated by minimal judicial intervention into the affairs of a school district.” 
Id. at 416 (emphasis added). “Good faith” also requires “the adoption and implementation of school 
board policies demonstrating a consistent pattern of lawful conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). The 
“long journey to unitary status cannot be completed where a school district’s compliance is 
constantly coerced by judicial edict . . . .” Id. at 417 (emphasis added); see also Morgan v. Nucci, 
831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) (“A finding of good faith . . . reduces the possibility that a school 
system’s compliance with court orders is but a temporary constitutional ritual.”). 
 118. This is not a comment on the normative value of the Freeman-Dowell “good faith” 
standard, but simply a statement that it does not help courts to more quickly return school districts 
back to state and local control. 
 119. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000). Parties can also stipulate to end federal court 
supervision over prison consent decrees earlier than two years after creation of the consent decree. 
 120. See id. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (commanding federal courts to “give substantial weight to any 
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief”) 
(emphasis added). While the statute does not specifically say “least intrusive means to state and local 
control,” it is clear from reading the statute that there would be an intrusion on states if the federal 
courts were to choose a more intrusive means. Id. 
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now only represent school desegregation decrees.121 The Supreme Court 
instructed in school desegregation cases that “federal supervision of local 
school systems was [always] intended as a temporary measure to remedy 
past discrimination,” emphasizing that consent decrees are temporary 
and schools must be returned to state control as soon as possible.122 
However, school desegregation cases still rely on broad, long-term 
judicial discretion and allow parties to provide remedies above the 
constitutional minimum, which prevents them from quickly restoring 
local control over school districts.123 In the prison reform area, experts 
claim that there has been “a significant decrease in the number of 
prisons, juvenile facilities, and jails under court order” since passage of 
the PLRA,124 demonstrating that courts have achieved success in 
returning prison systems back to state and local control. After 
consideration of the above factors, federal courts will likely continue to 
be more effective in quickly returning prisons under consent decrees to 
state control than school systems. 
 121. See United States v. Michigan, 62 F.3d 1418, 1995 WL 469430, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 
1995) (“In Lorain N.A.A.C.P., we held that a consent decree involving school desegregation, 
namely, institutional reform litigation, was subject to the same standards enunciated in Rufo and 
Heath.”). Since the PLRA, only school desegregation cases are subject to the flexible standards of 
Rufo and Dowell. See supra Part III for discussion of termination standards of school desegregation 
consent decrees. 
 122. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 (finding that if the district court concluded “that the purposes of 
the desegregation litigation had been fully achieved,” judicial supervision over the desegregation 
decree could be terminated); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299–301 (recognizing the 
“complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial 
discrimination” but requiring that school desegregation be carried out “with all deliberate speed”). 
However, there is no set standard that courts use to decide what is practicable, and sometimes courts 
seem to equate a long period of judicial supervision as adequate to show that the school district has 
done everything practicable to eliminate vestiges of past discrimination. Some courts recognize that 
regardless of the time period granted, some circumstances are beyond the control of the school 
district. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that “the gap in educational achievement between black and white students . . . would have 
been closed by now” if there were a “feasible means, decreeable by court, of closing the gap”). 
 123. With school desegregation, the Court stated that its “end purpose must be to remedy the 
violation and . . . to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is 
operating in compliance with the Constitution.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (citing 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1977)). The Court also expanded this reasoning to 
“other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional 
right,” such as prison reform cases. Id. at 487 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 
402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971)). 
 124. Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Litigation Reform Act Raises the Bar, CRIM. JUST., Winter 
2002, at 10, 16. 
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D. Effect of New Modification and Termination Standards on Incentives to 
Enter into Prison Reform and School Desegregation Decrees 
Besides affecting courts’ success in returning prisons and schools to 
local control, the new modification standards also change incentives for 
parties to enter into prison reform and school desegregation consent 
decrees rather than litigate. Traditional incentives to enter into consent 
decrees have been altered by the change in character of prison reform 
and school desegregation consent decrees. These changes could result in 
decreased incentive for parties to enter into prison reform consent 
decrees and possibly decreased incentive to enter into school 
desegregation consent decrees. 
First, the incentive for plaintiffs to enter into a consent decree to 
obtain broader remedies than are constitutionally required is diminished 
for prison reform cases but remains the same for school desegregation 
cases. In school desegregation cases, courts still allow parties to consent 
to more than the constitutional minimum to settle their disputes 
voluntarily with a consent decree. Parties do not have this option in 
litigated school desegregation cases.125 The incentive to enter consent 
 125. While some courts have applied the same Rufo standard to consent decrees and to 
modifying litigated judgments, this part of the rationale of Rufo, which allows parties to obtain 
broader remedies through a consent decree, has never applied in litigated cases. Although Rufo did 
not explicitly hold whether its new modification standard applied to litigated judgments as well as 
consent decrees, some courts have applied the Rufo two-prong test to determine whether to modify 
or vacate injunctive relief in litigated judgments. Bellevue Manor Assoc. v. United States, 165 F.3d 
1249, 1256−57 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 60(b)(5) sets forth the umbrella concept of 
“equitable” and that the Rufo standard applies in “determining whether to modify or vacate a prior 
injunction or consent decree”); In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
Rufo standard allows modification of injunctions whenever equity principles require); Lorain 
NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1149 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992); Heath v. De Courcy, 888 
F.2d 1105, 1107 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting “that in Swift the Court said the standard for modifying a 
decree is the same whether entered after trial or upon consent of the parties”). United States v. Swift, 
286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932), noted that “[t]he result is all one whether the decree has been entered after 
litigation or by consent.” See also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: 
Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1111 (1988) (“[T]he 
[Cardozo] opinion [in Swift] claimed that consent decrees should be treated the same as fully 
litigated decrees for modification purposes . . . .”). 
 In addition, the Supreme Court in Agostini v. Felton applied the Rufo test to a litigated decree 
providing relief from a permanent injunction based on later discredited Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 521 U.S. 203, 215, 238−39 (1997) (holding that modification or vacature of an 
injunction under Rule 60(b)(5) is required where there has been “a significant change either in 
factual conditions or in law”) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 
(1992)); Brief for Respondents at 16 n.2, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96–552, 96–
553) (“Although Rufo involved a consent decree, the district court held (Dist. Ct. Op. at 6), and 
petitioners agree, that Rufo’s general statements concerning the appropriate standard for relief under 
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decrees in school desegregation cases remains since courts will not allow 
parties to establish remedies above the constitutional minimum in 
litigated cases. Under the PLRA, there is no additional incentive to enter 
into a consent decree rather than litigate since the PLRA’s statutory 
provisions do not allow parties to obtain relief above the constitutional 
minimum. It is unclear how much of the PLRA applies to litigated 
judgments as well as consent decrees.126 Although the language of the 
Act is not explicit,127 the courts that have addressed this issue have 
decided that the PLRA does apply to injunctions granted in litigated 
judgments as well as consent decrees.128 Since the PLRA most likely 
applies to litigated judgments and consent decrees, neither can provide 
relief above the constitutional minimum, and consequently there is no 
additional incentive to enter into a consent decree rather than litigate. 
Rule 60(b) are applicable here.”); see also Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 
2000). 
 126. Some courts have found that a portion of the PLRA that requires all prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies applies to litigated decrees. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) [of the PLRA] requires a prisoner to exhaust 
available administrative remedies for his claim for monetary and injunctive relief before filing 
claims in federal court); see also Lavista v. Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
under the PLRA plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal 
court). 
 127. The termination provisions of the PLRA order termination of “any prospective relief if 
the relief” meets the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (2000) 
(emphasis added). Later the Act defines the term “relief” as “all relief in any form that may be 
granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private 
settlement agreements.” Id. § 3626(g)(9) (emphasis added). Here, the Act excludes private 
settlement agreements but not litigated judgments. The text of the PLRA also implicitly applies to 
litigated judgments since it refers to “civil actions” in which courts order temporary restraining 
orders or preliminary injunctive relief. Id. § 3626(a)(2). 
 128. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d in part, 124 F.3d 
162 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated on reh’g en banc, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (“What Congress has 
done here that has changed the law significantly is to apply the standards for a litigated judgment to 
all judgments, including those entered on consent.”) (emphasis added). In discussing the possible 
motivations of Congress in passing the PLRA, the district court in Benjamin noted that “Congress 
could also have wanted to create a uniform national standard for consent and litigated judgments 
based on a belief that consent judgments, even though agreed to initially, imposed severe burdens on 
states and local governments and that these burdens exceeded what was constitutionally required. 
These are legitimate interests.” Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 354; see Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 103 
F.3d 637, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating in dicta that the PLRA did not change the standards for 
determining whether to grant an injunction). But see Watson v. Ray, 192 F.3d 1153, 1156–57 & n.3 
(8th Cir. 1999) (declining to decide whether litigated judgments automatically comply with the 
PLRA where “the finding of unconstitutional conditions was made by the district court and not by 
the consent of the parties”). 
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Second, incentive for parties to enter into school desegregation 
consent decrees may diminish, since after Freeman-Dowell courts 
maintain more judicial discretion to terminate school desegregation 
consent decrees due to the good faith requirement.129 Since consent 
decrees in the school desegregation context are more characteristic of 
judicial orders than contracts, with broad judicial discretion, parties may 
lack the surety that they will receive what they bargained for in a consent 
decree. In turn, the incentive for parties to enter into school 
desegregation consent decrees may diminish. Judicial discretion does not 
impact incentives in prison reform cases, since the PLRA actually 
narrows judicial discretion in terminating decrees.130
On balance, this analysis indicates that parties will have less 
incentive to enter into prison reform consent decrees.131 Parties may also 
have decreased incentive to enter into school desegregation consent 
decrees if they value the ability to obtain remedies above the 
constitutional minimum more than they fear broader judicial discretion in 
terminating consent decrees. 
E. Recommendation for Courts: Apply Freeman-Dowell Only to 
Terminate School Desegregation Cases 
While the purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate the 
kaleidoscopic nature of prison reform and school desegregation consent 
decrees and not to offer a normative analysis of the current state of these 
decrees, one recommendation is appropriate to stop courts from creating 
a further disincentive to enter into school desegregation and other 
consent decrees. Courts should stop adopting the Freeman-Dowell 
termination standard to modify or terminate consent decrees outside of 
the school desegregation setting.132 As discussed above, the Freeman-
 129. As illustrated in the text accompanying notes 104–09, this does not indicate that courts 
under Freeman-Dowell will terminate consent decrees more quickly under the good faith standard. 
 130. See supra notes 78−83 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
 131. Even though parties in prison reform lack the ability to obtain broader remedies with 
consent decrees, they may still enter into consent decrees rather than litigate because they will save 
the cost of a trial and potentially obtain the same remedies they would after a trial. 
 132. For example, Wyatt v. Rogers applies the Freeman-Dowell good faith standard to 
terminate a consent decree binding a mental health facility. 985 F. Supp. 1356, 1385 (M.D. Ala. 
1997). Several cases have also combined the Rufo and Freeman-Dowell factors as important in 
modifying or terminating an injunction. For an example, see Crutchfield v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, wherein the court stated: 
  Relevant decisional law has identified a number of factors that serve to focus the 
inquiry whether to modify or dissolve an injunction. Among these are the following: (1) 
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Dowell good faith standard allows judges broad judicial discretion to 
terminate decrees.133 Broad discretion is warranted with school 
desegregation decrees where courts attempt to reach the idealistic goal of 
a “unitary” school district when vestiges of past discrimination are 
difficult to ascribe to a school district or to socio-economic factors. 
However, the good faith standard should not be expanded to other 
contexts because it allows judges more flexibility than the Rufo standard 
and allows courts to place less emphasis on granting parties what they 
agreed to in a decree. The expansion of the good faith standard can act as 
a disincentive for parties to enter into consent decrees,134 which are a 
beneficial dispute resolution tool. Application of the Rufo standard in 
terminating school desegregation cases can also cause further 
disincentive for parties to enter into school desegregation consent 
decrees because parties entering decrees will not have any surety of what 
standard the court will apply when it comes to terminating the decree. 
However, courts should continue to apply the Rufo standard in modifying 
consent decrees in school desegregation cases and in other substantive 
areas of the law.135
the circumstances leading to entry of the injunction and the nature of the conduct sought 
to be prevented; (2) the length of time since entry of the injunction; (3) whether the party 
subject to its terms has complied or attempted to comply in good faith with the 
injunction; (4) the likelihood that the conduct or conditions sought to be prevented will 
recur absent the injunction; (5) whether the moving party can demonstrate a significant, 
unforeseen change in the facts or law and whether such changed circumstances have 
made compliance substantially more onerous or have made the decree unworkable; and 
(6) whether the objective of the decree has been achieved and whether continued 
enforcement would be detrimental to the public interest. 
175 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (E.D. Va. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Bldg. and Constr. Trades 
Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1995). 
The termination standard, which takes into account whether the terms of the decree have been 
met (and not good faith), should be used to terminate consent decrees in other substantive areas of 
the law. That standard is discussed supra note 37. 
 133. See supra Part III.B for a description of the Freeman-Dowell good faith standard. 
 134. If judicial authority to oversee a consent decree is too broad, this may weigh against a 
party’s decision to enter into a consent decree. Thomas Mengler notes: 
  Implicit, therefore, in the parties’ decision to settle by consent decree is the idea that 
entering into a consent decree poses fewer future uncertainties than litigating. Parties who 
settle in the form of a consent decree believe they limit significantly the court’s discretion 
to frame relief. If the parties are wrong in this assumption — that is, if the court, in 
implementing a consent decree, has broad discretion to alter the terms — they will be less 
inclined to use the consent decree procedure. 
Mengler, supra note 21, at 330. 
 135. Two reservations accompany this general recommendation of broadly applying the Rufo 
standard for modification. First, there should be more analysis of the specific type of consent decree 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the PLRA termination provisions and the advent of the 
Freeman-Dowell termination standards, prison reform and school 
desegregation consent decrees have both changed in character from a 
hybrid judicial order and contract to resemble a judicial order. School 
(i.e., employment and labor, environmental, civil rights, antitrust) before wholesale application of 
Rufo. See supra note 25 for discussion of applying Rufo to institutional reform and noninstitutional 
reform cases. Second, there may be a lack of uniformity problem in modification under Rufo, which 
demonstrates that courts may struggle in applying its standards consistently and may cast some 
doubt on the appropriateness of broadly applying Rufo. As discussed earlier, before the new 
modification standards, the Rufo test was applied to both school desegregation and prison reform 
decrees. Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1149 (6th Cir. 1992). However, the 
application of the Rufo test in the two contexts was not always uniform, as in Reed v. Rhodes and 
Cooper v. Noble, discussed below. However, inconsistent application may be solved through more 
careful application of Rufo rather than abandoning Rufo for another modification test or statutory 
standards. 
For example, in Reed v. Rhodes, the original school desegregation consent decree required 
that the “racial composition of the student body of any school within the system” not deviate more 
than 15% from the percent ratio of the school district as a whole. 179 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1999). 
During the life of the decree, the parties implemented a new educational program allowing more 
parental choice in student assignments. Id. at 463–64. The court majority determined that the 15% 
requirement and the new program were irreconcilable, id. at 464, and that the new program was a 
“material factual change and unforeseen circumstance” which would compel the court to modify the 
existing decree. Id. at 457. However, earlier in the opinion, the majority admitted that in the first few 
years of the Vision 21 program, it “came as no surprise” to anyone that forty schools “exceeded the 
15% remedial mandate.” Id. at 464 (emphasis added). Since it was expected that the Vision 21 
program would cause more schools to fall out of the 15% parameter established by the consent 
decree, the dissent in Reed argued that this was an anticipated circumstance, not an unforeseen 
circumstance justifying modification. Id. at 479 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
In the prison reform context, a court applied the same Rufo test and rejected modification 
under similarly “anticipated” circumstances. In Cooper v. Noble, county officials moved for relief 
from a prison consent decree claiming that “‘dramatic’ and ‘unforeseen’ changes have occurred” in 
the Madison County Detention Center (“MCDC”) since the decree was issued and that the new 
center housed more prisoners with more diverse criminal records from different governmental 
agencies, which made “compliance” with the consent decree “substantially more onerous.” 33 F.3d 
540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 1994). The court rejected the county officials’ modification request because 
“many or all of [the changes] were changes made by the county officials [themselves],” id., pointing 
to evidence that the officials “enjoy[ed]” working in the new prison facility and also “that the 
MCDC voluntarily accept[ed] federal inmates.” Id. at 544 n.7 (emphasis added). Since the county 
officials voluntarily created the factual change in circumstances, the court held that they clearly did 
not reasonably try to comply with the consent decree despite changed circumstances. Id. at 544. 
The courts in Cooper and Reed both should have rejected modification under Rufo. As in 
Cooper, where the county officials voluntarily created the changes that they felt warranted a 
modification of the consent decree, in Reed the school district voluntarily adopted a new program 
that did not meet the conditions of the original consent decree. But while the court of appeals in 
Cooper ruled that voluntary changes in circumstances do not warrant modification, the court of 
appeals in Reed ruled in favor of modifying of the consent decree. 
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desegregation cases apply a two-prong vestiges and good faith analysis, 
which allows for broad judicial discretion in terminating decrees. The 
two-prong test also relies more on obedience of parties to court orders 
than remedying the constitutional violation set out in the decree. Prison 
reform cases, under statutory provisions, allow for narrow judicial 
discretion and have also transformed the character of consent decrees to 
resemble judicial orders by removing the “changed circumstance” 
requirement and substituting it with the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” 
requirement. The new requirements rely more on how tailored the 
remedy is to the violation than on granting the parties what they agreed 
to in the decree. 
The kaleidoscopic change in prison reform and school desegregation 
decrees is not just a semantic change, but the alteration in treatment of 
consent decrees in these areas has several broad-reaching effects. First, 
because PLRA prison reform cases reject broad judicial discretion and 
long-term supervision over consent decrees, they will likely continue to 
achieve success in quickly returning prison systems to state and local 
control. On the other hand, school desegregation cases still rely on broad 
judicial discretion and long-term judicial supervision over decrees and 
will likely be less successful at quickly returning control over school 
systems to state and local governments. 
Second, due to changes in the character of consent decrees in prison 
reform and school desegregation, the PLRA may decrease the incentive 
for plaintiffs to enter into consent decrees rather than litigate. The PLRA 
no longer allows parties to obtain remedies above the constitutional 
minimum in consent decrees, reducing the incentive for parties to enter 
into consent decrees. School desegregation cases may decrease incentive 
to enter into consent decrees by allowing courts broad discretion in 
termination of decrees. However, parties may retain incentive to enter 
into consent decrees, since school desegregation decrees still allow 
parties to provide remedies above the constitutional minimum, where 
litigated decrees do not allow broader remedies. Finally, courts should 
balance the disincentive for parties to enter school desegregation consent 
decrees and possibly other types of consent decrees by applying 
Freeman-Dowell to terminate only school desegregation cases and Rufo 
to modify consent decrees in school desegregation cases and other areas. 
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